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Our Sponsors |
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AFSCME Council 31
AFSCME Retirees
Chapter 31
Chicago
Federation of Labor
Illinois AFL-CIO
Illinois
Education Association
Illinois
Education Association Retirees
Illinois
Federation of Teachers
Illinois
Retired State Employees
Association
Illinois Retired Teachers
Association
Service Employees
International Union Local 73
State University Annuitants
Association
University Professionals of
Illinois/AFT Local 4100 |
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Welcome to the first
issue of The Illinois Retirement
Security Initiative (IRSI)
newsletter. IRSI is a project of
The Center for Tax and Budget
Accountability. IRSI is committed
to producing and publishing accurate
information about the status of
public employee benefit systems. IRSI's
goal is to ensure public retirement
benefits in Illinois are adequately
designed and financed to attract
high quality employees to the public
sector.
This
monthly publication will serve that
end. IRSI will keep readers abreast
of both the Initiative's work as
well as what is going on in the
world of public employee retirement
benefits both locally and
nationally.
Director of The Illinois Retirement
Security Initiative
Center for Tax and Budget
Accountability
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An Illinois Public
Employee Retirement Systems Primer
The five
public employee retirement systems in
Illinois; State Employees Retirement System
(SERS), Teachers Retirement System (TRS),
State University Retirement System (SURS),
Judges Retirement System (JRS), and the
General Assembly Retirement System (GARS)
have collectively promised employees $103.1
billion in benefits upon retirement.
However, these systems only have $62.3
billion in assets. The $40.7 billion
difference is known as Illinois unfunded
pension liability. To place this number
into context, realize Illinois FY 2006 total
general fund revenue was $28.65 billion.
Meaning Illinois $40.7 billion dollar
unfunded liability represents 142 % of
FY2006 total general fund revenue.
Another way to measure
states unfunded pension pliability is by its
funded ratio. Funded ratio places the
unfunded liabilities in the context of the
retirement system's assets. Expressed as a
percentage of a system's liabilities, the
funded ratio is calculated by dividing net
assets by the accrued liabilities. The
result is the percentage of the accrued
liabilities that are covered by assets. At
a 100 percent, a fully funded system has
sufficient assets to pay all benefits earned
to date by all its members. A funded ratio
below 80 percent is generally considered
cause for concern. Illinois current funded
ratio is 60.5 percent.
According to the most
recent state comparison of unfunded pension
liabilities by Wilshire Research Associates,
Illinois has the worst unfunded pension
liability in the nation. The second worst,
Ohio, maintains an unfunded liability of a
mere $28.7 billion, nowhere near Illinois
$40.7 billion. Additionally, Illinois has
the second worse funded ratio, surpassed
only by West Virginia. West Virginia has a
funded ratio of 40%, however their unfunded
liability is a measly $5.5 billion. Such
comparisons of states pension systems make
it clear that Illinois public pension
systems face a fiscal burden incomparable to
any other state.
How did Illinois'
situation get so bad?
The three primary
sources of contributions which finance
Illinois state retirement systems are
employee contributions, employer (the state)
contributions and investment returns. Each
year employees have continuously made their
contributions and investment returns have
been quite successful. In fact Illinois
teacher contributions at 9.4% are amongst
the highest in the nation and investment
income in FY05 accounted for 65 % of all TRS
funding.
However, employee
contributions and excellent investment
returns have not been enough to counter
thirty-plus years of the state failing to
fund the full normal cost owed to the
pension systems. Illinois has consistently
failed to make their contributions not due
to the high cost of the Illinois pension
system, which is 73 % below the national
average, but because historically as the
state has found itself short of the revenue
need to cover both essential services and
its required pension contributions, Illinois
frequently opted to skirt full funding of
the pensions to maintain spending on
services. Essentially, the Illinois state
government has been borrowing against the
employer contribution it owes the pension
systems annually, just to cover the cost of
providing services.
Unfortunately, when
the state fails to pay its required
contributions, the amount it ultimately must
contribute grows substantially over time.
That is because under state law, any funding
shortfall must be paid back with interest,
compounded at each retirement system's
target rate of return, currently pegged at
8.0% to 8.5% per year, depending on the
pension fund. Thus, each year a pension
obligation remains unpaid, the investment
return the state must make up on the unpaid
contribution compounds. Over time, this
chronic failure to make the full employer
contribution is the primary reason Illinois
state government arrived at where it is
today, facing a $40.7 billion unfunded
pension liability.
What has been done to
address the problem?
Illinois attempted to
address its unfunded pension liability in
1994, pursuant to a change in Illinois law
created under P.A. 88-0593, which became
commonly known as the 'pension ramp'.
Intended to force increased allocations to
the pension over time, this reform
established a timeframe during which
Illinois was required to fund the current
pension contribution the state owed for
existing employees, the normal cost, plus
make up unpaid contributions and the return
thereon for prior employees, amortized over
50 years with a target of funding 90% of
total actuarial liabilities by 2045.
Given that the total
unfunded liability had grown so large, the
legislation created a framework that
established a 15 year ramp period, during
which the newly mandated contributions
Illinois had to make for current and past
employees increased in gradual increments.
Since these make-up payments increased
annually, they became known as the "pension
ramp", that is, they "ramp-up" over
time.
The pension ramp
became operative in Fiscal Year 1996. Under
the plan, if Illinois satisfied its
obligations under the Pension Ramp, the
state's pension systems would have achieved
a Funded Ratio of 90% by the year 2045. The
initial 15 year ramp up period was designed
to allow Illinois to adapt to its increased
financial obligations, because there simply
was not enough revenue to move immediately
to the appropriate level percentage of
payroll to fund the pensions systems or to
amortize the liability over a shorter
period.
Since it passed,
Illinois funded the Pension Ramp as required
every year, except FY2006 through 2007.
However, the annual increases in the
required contribution under the intended
Pension Ramp vastly outpace natural growth
in the state's tax revenue. This reality,
coupled with the constitutional requirement
that Illinois balance the budget, meant the
state would have to cut spending
significantly on services to fund the
Pension Ramp, particularly in out years.
The net result, Illinois' fiscal system
simply could not accommodate the significant
contribution increases contemplated under
the Pension Ramp. The first major threat to
the Pension Ramp was averted with the sale
of $10 billion of pension obligation bonds
in 2004. Then, reverting to past poor
fiscal practices, the state significantly
underfunded pensions in FY2006 and FY2007,
to maintain, and in some cases expand,
services.
What must be done?
Any major refinancing
of the state's unfunded pension liability
ought to include elimination of the current
pension ramp, which irresponsibly backloads
costs. This effectively defers the problem
to future generations, and constrains the
state's ongoing ability to fund services.
Illinois should replace its existing pension
ramp with a flat, annual payment amortizing
the unfunded liability in equal, annual
installments over a period of 40 to 45
years. This will make the obligation far
less constrictive of state finances, as the
real value of the flat annual payment will
decrease over time, after inflation.
Resources:
For
more information about Illinois burgeoning
unfunded liability and pension problems
please read:
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Myth vs. Reality: The Defined Benefit and
Defined Contribution Systems Debate
Myth #1:
"Switching the public
sector from a defined benefit to defined
contribution system would save states
money."
Reality:
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Defined
contribution systems have
significantly higher annual
administrative costs than fully
funded defined benefit systems.
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According to
the Investment Management Institute,
the operating expense ratio for
defined benefit plans averages 31
basis points (31 cents per $100 of
assets); the average for defined
contribution plans is three to six
times higher at 96 to 175 basis
points.
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To put that in
context of the Illinois pension
systems, the administrative costs of
a defined contribution system would
in all likelihood be anywhere from
$275 million to $610 million more
expensive annually than the state's
current defined benefit systems.
Myth #2:
"Defined benefit
systems have inordinately high costs."
Reality:
-
The weighted
average "normal cost" across all
five Illinois pension systems, as a
percentage of active members'
payroll, averages 9.13 percent.
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The national
average for state and local
government is 12.5 percent, placing
the normal cost of Illinois' current
defined benefit program far below
the national average.
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Moreover,
going forward, a fully funded
defined benefit system can save
taxpayers money annually that would
be impossible to save under a
defined contribution system.
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Under a
defined contribution system, all
investment returns belong solely to
the employees' individual account,
good returns cannot be used to
reduce annual costs to taxpayers.
However, in a defined benefit system
returns can and frequently do assist
in reducing costs to taxpayers. Take
for example the experience of the
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund
(IMRF).
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The IMRF, the
second largest pension fund in
Illinois covering public employees
such as bus drivers, sewer workers
and municipal administrators, has
enjoyed a funding advantage for
years, in large part because it has
relentlessly demanded full and on
time payments from member government
employers and employees.
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As a result,
the IMRF has consistently maintained
high levels of funding.
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As of December
31, 2006, IMRF was 100.5 percent
funded on an actuarial basis.
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Because of
this, government employers within
the IMRF will enjoy lower
contribution rates in 2007.
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Rates will
fall from an average 10.04 percent
in 2006 to 9.72 percent this year,
saving taxpayers millions.
Myth # 3:
"Pension benefits
offered to public employees in Illinois are
overly generous."
Reality:
-
According to
U.S. census data, the average
monthly pension payment to state
government employees nationally was
$1,374 in 2001-2002.
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At the same
time, the average Illinois payment
was $1,426, a difference of just 3.7
percent.
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An annual
retirement income of $17,112 is
barely enough to live on in
Illinois. In fact, an annual income
of $17,112 is only $3,422 away from
the poverty level for a family of
two under federal government
standards.
Myth # 3:
"Illinois has too many
public employees."
Reality:
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The total
number of participants in the
state's various pension plans
represents a meager 5.3% of
Illinois' total population.
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That's because
historically, Illinois has not been
a high public employee head count
state.
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Instead,
Illinois is mostly a grant making
state that is, rather than hire
state employees to provide services,
Illinois disburses grants to
independent providers such as
Lutheran Social Services or Catholic
Charities, which in turn deliver the
service to the public.
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Illinois actually ranks 50th
among the states, dead last in the
nation, in number of state employees
per capita.
Myth # 4:
"The significant shift
from defined benefit to defined contribution
systems in the private sector demonstrates
the undue cost and uncompetitiveness of
defined benefit systems."
Reality:
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Much of the
increased utilization of defined
contribution systems in private
industry was caused by the passage
of the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"). ERISA
established standards for defined
benefit plan participation, vesting,
retirement, and reporting; and
imposed a tax on defined benefit
plans to fund the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC").
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These changes
reduced or eliminated incentives to
private sector employers offering
defined benefit plans, and increased
the liability, expense, or
regulatory requirements of
maintaining a private sector defined
benefit plan.
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As a reaction
to the importance of these new
standards and costs, many small to
midsized private sector businesses
moved away from defined benefit
systems toward defined contribution
systems.
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However, state
and local government pension plans
are not subject to most ERISA
regulations and amendments.
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Moreover,
public plans are not required to
make payments to the PGBC.
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As a result,
the primary factor, ERISA, that
pushed the private sector toward
defined contribution plans does not
even apply to state and local
governments.
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Interestingly,
even after the ERISA motivated shift
to defined contribution systems in
the private sector, costs of moving
to a defined contribution system
were so much higher than the
potential tax burden under ERISA,
large, private business
predominantly continued to use
defined benefit systems.
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Fully 75
percent of the Fortune 500 still use
defined benefit plans as their main
retirement benefit system.
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Public sector
employers are typically large
employers.
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If large
employers in the private sector
still favor defined benefit systems
despite the added costs and
administrative burdens imposed by
ERISA, there seems to be no reason
for the public sector, which does
not have those costs and burdens, to
abandon defined benefit systems.
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This is especially so, given the
higher administration costs that
defined contribution systems would
impose on taxpayers.
Harsh
Realities:
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If
contribution rates remained the
same, defined contribution systems
can be expected to generate
significantly lower retirement
benefits for greater costs. This
was the specific experience of
Nebraska which switched to a defined
contribution system 30 years ago and
recently shifted back to a defined
benefit system.
The Nebraska
Experience:
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In the mid
1960's, Nebraska switched from a
defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan for state and
county government employees.
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Immediately,
that state noted it was paying
higher administrative costs for its
new, defined contribution system.
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Over time,
Nebraska found that, when compared
to its defined benefit plan, the new
defined contribution plan cost the
state significantly more in
investment management fees,
record-keeping fees, educational
programs and other administrative
line items.
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In 1999,
Nebraska's administrative expenses
for its defined contribution plans
were double the costs of its defined
benefit plans.
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Additionally,
the state of Nebraska found that
when employees managed their own
investments under that state's
defined contribution plan,
investment returns were in fact
lower than under the state's defined
benefit system.
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During the
period from 1983 to 1999, Nebraska
state and county workers averaged a
6 percent return when investing
their individual retirement accounts
in that state's defined contribution
plan, versus the 11 percent return
for teachers and judges under
Nebraska's defined benefit plan.
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The actual
investment differential in favor of
the defined benefit system becomes
even greater once the lower
administrative costs of the defined
benefit system are factored in.
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One key reason
public defined contribution plan
returns lag defined benefit
portfolios is simple, asset
allocations made by employees in a
defined contribution setting are
often quite conservative.
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The Nebraska
experience is illustrative.
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Despite state
education programs on the importance
of proper asset allocation and
eleven different investment options,
90 percent of Nebraska's employees
invested all their individual plan
deposits in just three funds.
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This suggests
employees lack the proper skills to
diversify their assets and make
sound investments.
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Under a
defined benefit system, experienced
portfolio managers invest plan
assets under carefully considered
asset allocation models geared
toward long term returns.
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The bottom
line was clear, Nebraska found that
ten years after retirement, a
retiree in that state's defined
contribution plan with 30 years of
service and an average annual salary
of $30,000, had about $11,230
annually in retirement benefits,
which is $2,460 less than the
poverty level for a family of two.
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Participants
in Nebraska's defined benefit plan
with similar pay and service credit,
however, had an annual retirement
benefit of $16,797, which is $3,100
more than the poverty level for a
family of two.
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Faced with
irrefutable data illustrating that
defined contribution systems provide
lower benefits for employees at
higher costs to taxpayers, Nebraska
legislators changed back to a
defined benefit model in 2002.
The state's duty
to maintain pension benefit levels for its
public employees is directly mandated in the
Illinois Constitution. The absolute nature
of this responsibility means the unfunded
liability cannot be legislated away; the
debt must be repaid.
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In fact,
because the state is
constitutionally required to provide
retirees the benefits they earned,
any proposed change to Illinois
pension benefits can only operate on
a prospective basis.
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That means any
legislation the state passes to
reduce pension benefits will only
apply to public employees newly
hired after the change in law
goes into effect.
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Thus any
significant savings from proposed
changes to the state's pension
system will not be realized for many
years, until those new hires become
a significant portion of the state
workforce.
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Because of
this constitutional mandate, any
change in the type or value of
benefits offered public employees
will in no way reduce the $40.7
billion in accrued, unfunded pension
liability.
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The only
way the state can address this
obligation is to develop a rational
way to pay it over time, one that
does not backload costs, and has a
dedicated, sustainable revenue
stream.
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Is
Illinois 90% Funding Goal Prudent?
While any
major refinancing of the state's unfunded
pension liability ought to include
elimination of the current pension ramp,
which irresponsibly backloads costs, the
benefits undeniably illustrate that Illinois
should not only continue to aim for a high
level of funding, but should possibly
increase their expectations to a 100%
funding goal. Why?
1. Savings to current taxpayers.
The "normal
cost" of a pension system is the
contribution required from an employer to
fund the plan's benefits. In the typical
public sector defined benefit retirement
system, normal cost is the annual percentage
of total payroll a government employer must
contribute to fund the promised benefit for
its current workforce, based on actuarial
tables. This contribution can be funded
from a combination of tax revenue collected
from the general public and investment
returns earned on plan assets, if the
returns are high enough to cover anticipated
benefits, plus a portion of the employer's
current normal cost contribution.
Frequently, fully-funded defined benefit
plans attain high enough investment returns
that public sector employers are able to
reduce the amount of normal cost paid from
tax collections, freeing taxpayer revenue to
cover services. This cost savings can be
significant, as the experience of the
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund ("IMRF")
demonstrates.
The IMRF, the second largest pension fund in
Illinois covering public employees such as
bus drivers, sewer workers and municipal
administrators, has enjoyed a funding
advantage for years, in large part because
it has relentlessly demanded full and on
time payments from member government
employers and employees and has consistently
aimed for 100% funding.
At the beginning of 2003, IMRF was 101.5
percent funded on an actuarial basis. If
they had been 90 percent funded, they would
have earned 2.7 billion ($3.0 billion times
90 percent). The
difference would have been $300 million.
That difference would have been paid by
future taxpayers.
Additionally, as of December 31, 2006 IMRF
employees and retirees had reached 100.5
percent of their funding pension
obligations. Because
of this, public employers within the IMRF
will enjoy lower contribution rates in
2007. Rates will fall from an average 10.04
percent in 2006 to 9.72 percent this year,
saving taxpayers millions.
2. Future taxpayers are not
burdened with higher taxes.
Delaying payment of the full expenses
incurred by taxpayers in one year to future
years places a greater burden on future
generation of taxpayers.
It may make sense for future generations to
pay for a municipal building with a 50 year
life expectancy. But, does it make sense
for a taxpayer who moves into a state in
2004 to pay for services rendered by its
employees in 1994, 1984, 1964 or 1954?
By paying less than 100% of current
employee's pension costs, future generations
will be forced to pick up the tab.
3. Employees will continue to make
their 100% contribution.
Throughout Illinois' historical underfunding
of its pension systems, employees have
always made on time and full contributions
to the retirement fund. Is it fair for an
employer to fund a retirement benefit at 90%
while requiring employee to continue their
100% contribution?
Granted, the pension is fully funded at
retirement, but why should new employees
contribute only a fraction of the required
contribution until they become vested or
until they retire? Just like units of
government, employees would probably like to
have more take home pay until they need to
retire.
4. It is the pension industry
standard.
The Government Accounting Standard Board
requires funding for 100 percent. Monies
are set aside and invested. Investment
returns reduce future employer
contributions. Investment returns generally
represent the vast majority of retirement
systems revenue.
Prefunding retirement obligations (IMRF) can
be contrasted with pay-as-you-go retirement
plans (Social Security). The problems
facing Social Security boil down to who will
pay the cost of an ever growing group of
retirees as the labor force slows in growth.
At a national level in 2000, there were 4.8
workers for every person age 65 or older.
By 2030, that number is expected to decline
around 2.9.
Illinois
faces the same demographic issues. In 1999,
the IMRF had 2.2 workers contributing for
every 1 worker in retirement. By 2015, this
ratio is expected to decline to
approximately 1 worker for every retiree and
perhaps to go even lower by the time the
last baby boomer retires. Retirement funds
need to build reserves to meet this
challenge. |
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The Face of Illinois Public Employees
and Retirees
The five public
employee retirement systems in Illinois are
the: State Employees Retirement System ('SERS'),
Downstate Teacher's Retirement System ('TRS'),
State Universities Retirement System ('SURS'),
Judges Retirement System ('JRS') and
General Assembly Retirement System ('GARS').
Three primary sources of contributions
finance Illinois' State retirement systems:
employee contributions, employer
contributions and returns on investments.
The figures below paint a picture of typical
Illinois public employees and retirees,
followed by some numbers which will help
place this information into context.
SURS in Brief
Who are the people who
participate in SURS?
·
SURS participants are comprised of academics
and staff serving at Illinois universities
and community colleges (including the City
Colleges of Chicago).
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The average gross salary of a SURS
participant is $40,696.
·
Each participant contributes annually 8
percent of their gross salary to their
pension fund.
Who is a typical SURS
retiree?
·
A typical SURS is 62 years old and has
served an Illinois University or community
college for 20 years.
What sort of benefits
do SURS retirees receive?
·
The typical SURS retiree receives a monthly
benefit of $2,508.
SURS participants do not contribute to
social security.
TRS in Brief
Who are the people who
participate in TRS?
·
TRS participants are comprised of Illinois
public school teachers and administrators.
·
The average gross salary of a TRS
participant is $56,916.
·
Each participant contributes annually 9.4
percent of their gross salary to their
pension fund.
Who is a typical TRS
retiree?
·
A typical TRS retiree is 69 and has served
Illinois public schools for 29 years.
What sort of benefits
do TRS retirees receive?
·
The typical TRS retiree receives a monthly
benefit of $3,173.
TRS participants do not contribute to social
security.
SERS in Brief
Who are the people who
participate in SERS?
·
SERS participants are comprised of all state
employees.
·
The average gross salary of a SERS
participant is $52,479.
·
Each participant contributes annually 4
percent of their gross salary to their
pension fund.
Who is a typical SERS
retiree?
·
A typical SERS retiree is 69 years old and
has served Illinois for 25 years.
What sort of benefits
do SERS retirees receive?
·
The typical SERS retiree receives a monthly
benefit of $1,974.35.
With the exception of police and
firefighters, virtually all SERS
participants contribute to social security.
GARS in Brief
Who are the people who
participate in GARS?
·
GARS participants are comprised of members
of the general assembly and certain state
officials within Illinois.
·
The average gross salary of a GARS
participant is $69,995.
·
Each participant contributes annually 11.5
percent of their gross salary to their
pension fund.
Who is a typical GARS
retiree?
·
A typical GARS retiree is 60 years old and
has served the Illinois General Assembly or
state of Illinois for 14 years.
What sort of benefits
do GARS retirees receive?
·
The typical GARS retiree receives a monthly
benefit of $3,650.
GARS participants do not contribute to
social security.
JRS in Brief
Who are the people who
participate in JRS?
·
JRS participants are comprised of judges
serving within Illinois courts.
·
The average gross salary of a JRS
participant is $147,655.
·
Each participant contributes annually 11
percent of their gross salary to their
pension fund.
Who is a typical JRS
retiree?
·
A typical JRS retiree is a 63 year old
attorney who has served as an Illinois judge
for 17 years.
What sort of benefits
do JRS retirees receive?
·
The typical JRS retiree receives a monthly
benefit of $8,015.
JRS participants do not contribute to social
security.
The following figures
provide some facts about Illinois which will
allow you to place the data above into
perspective.
Illinois
-
The total of all
participants in the state's pension
plans represent only 5.3% of Illinois
total population. In fact, Illinois
ranks dead last in the nation, in number
of employees per capita.
-
TRS makes up
49.53% of the participants in the
Illinois pension plans, SURS makes up
28.79%, SERS makes up 21.3%, JRS makes
up 0.97% and GARS makes up 0.27%.
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According to the
Illinois State Comptroller, pension
benefits paid to regular state employees
in Illinois are low relative to benefits
provided by other states. Illinois
ranks in the bottom one fifth of all
states for retirement benefits paid to
an average state worker.
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Illinois currently faces a 40.7 billion
unfunded pension liability, worst in the
nation, because while employees have
made their full pension contributions on
time each year since the inception of
the state retirement systems, the state
has failed to fully fund the system
since 1974. Unfortunately,
under state law, any funding shortfall
must be paid back with interest.
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Normal cost is the
current total contribution required to
fund the promised benefit on retirement,
based on actuarial tables. It is
typically expressed as the percentage of
current payroll needed to fund future
benefits. The 'normal cost' across all
five Illinois' pension systems, as a
percentage of active members' payroll,
averages 9.13 percent. The national
average for state and local government
is 12.5 percent, placing the normal cost
of Illinois' current defined benefit
program far below the national average.
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In fact, for
Fiscal Year 2006, the normal cost was
$1.33 billion. However, the FY06
required pension payment was $2.1
billion, meaning if Illinois had no
unfunded pension liability, it would
have an addition $770 million for public
services like education, public safety
and transportation.
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A common
misconception is that taxpayers shoulder
most of the cost of funding public
pension systems. To the contrary,
investment income accounts for the
majority of Illinois state retirement
funding. In fiscal year 2006 alone, the
system spent $5.3 billion on benefits,
expenses and related administrative
costs. Member and state contributions
only totaled $2.3 billion; however an
additional $6.7 billion was earned in
investment income from a healthy world
equities market leading to a $3.7
billion increase in pension assets for
the year.
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In fact investment
income accounted for nearly 65% of all
TRS funding for FY05.
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According to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services the poverty level for a family
of 2 is $13, 690 annually or $1,140.83 a
month. Only $834 less than the average
SERS retiree.
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Moreover,
Chicago's overall cost of living is
about 66% above the national average,
with the typical Chicago apartment
renting for just over $1,000 a month
with utilities costing an average of $86
per month.
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Public Sector Retirement News
From Across the Country for August '07'
Alabama
$50 Million Placed in
Health Care Trust
By David White
The Birmingham News
August 16, 2007
The State Employees'
Insurance Board voted Wednesday to put $50
million into a trust designed to help
Alabama pay future health care costs for its
retired public employees.
Lawmakers in March
passed a law directing the SEIB and the
board for the Public Education Employees'
Health Insurance Plan each to create and run
its own trust.
[Read More]
California
The Pension Debate:
Real Problem or Red Herring
By Anthony York
Capitol Weekly
August 16, 2007
A year after Gov.
Arnold Schwarzenegger aborted his attempt at
changing the state's public employee pension
system, the governor and legislative leaders
got together to appoint a commission to look
at what is often called the state's pension
crisis. But depending on who you talk to,
it is a crisis that may or may not exist.
[Read More]
Initiative Aims to Cut
Pension Health Costs for Public Employees
By John Woolfolk
San Jose Mercury News
August 15, 2007
As government
officials throughout California grapple with
the ballooning costs of public employee
pensions and health care, two conservative
politicians want voters to pop the bubble.
The two are seeking to qualify a ballot
initiative that would dramatically shrink
retirement benefits for new state and local
workers.
The proposed
initiative would amend the state
constitution to place limits on pensions and
retiree health benefits for state and local
government employees hired on or after July
1, 2009
[Read More]
CalPERS to Halt Global
Screening
By Gilber Chan
The Sacramento Bee
August 14, 2007
Once touted as a bold
initiative, a landmark strategy that barred
investments in politically troubled emerging
market countries was scrapped Monday by
trustees of the California Public Employees'
Retirement System.
[Read More]
Retired Teachers'
Health Care 'Crisis' is Overblown
By Marty Hittelman
San Francisco
Chronicle
August 9, 2007
Although teachers are
underpaid for the valuable work that they
do, most of them have at least been able to
count on district provided health insurance
after they retire. But rising health care
costs are putting pressures on school and
college districts to reduce or eliminate
health insurance for their retirees. One
proposed solution - pre-funding- doesn't
address the root of the problem, and may
make matters worse.
[Read More]
University of California Reprieve on
Workers' Pension Contributions
By Charles Buress
San Francisco
Chronicle
August 8, 2007
About 122,000
University of California employees received
welcome news Tuesday when the university
announced they won't have to make individual
contributions to their pensions after all,
at least not for a while.
The reason: UC's $48
billion pension fund earned more than
expected on its investments - 19.1 percent
gross in the fiscal year ending June 30, up
from 7.1 percent in the previous year.
[Read More]
California's SEIU Local 1000 Ups dues 50% to
Help Fight Pension Reform Initiative
By Christine Mai-Duc
Capitol Weekly
August 6, 2007
Many State workers did
a double-take on their payroll stubs last
week as the 50 percent increase to member
dues and fair share payments approved last
year by SEIU Local 1000 took effect.
The increase, which
raises dues from 1 percent to 1.5 percent of
state worker salaries, has prompted an
ongoing conflict among the union's rank and
file over what some call an unnecessary
burden on member's pocketbooks.
[Read More]
Colorado
PERA says Fund Problem
Fixed For Most Employees
By David Milstead
Rock Mountain News
August 21, 2007
The Colorado Public
Employees' Retirement Association Believes
it's fixed its funding problem for most of
its employees, thanks to a great 2006
investment return and higher funding coming
in the future.
Still, the plan
remains unable to forecast paying off its
liability to state employee, one of the
largest in PERA.
[Read More]
Hawaii
ERS Gains Record 17%
in Fiscal Year
By Kristen Consillio
Honolulu Star Bulletin
August 14, 2007
The Hawaii Employees'
Retirement System posted its fourth
consecutive double-digit gain in the fiscal
year, boosting its total assets to a record
$11.6 billion.
The state's largest
pension fund chalked up a fourth-quarter
gain of 5 percent and a record 17.3 percent
annual gain --- the best fiscal year
performance in a decade and more than double
the 8 percent yearly target return needed to
meet its obligations.
[Read More]
Louisiana
Bumper Returns for
LASERS
By Elizabeth Pfeuti
Global Pensions
August 22, 2007
The Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System (LASERS)
produced a 19.2% return for the fiscal year
ending June 2007, taking its assets to US
$9.1 bn.
In the past year, the
organization's domestic equity portfolio
outperformed the previous three and five
year return rates, as emerging market
equities delivered more than a 50% return.
[Read More]
Massachusetts
State Pension System
Takes Hit in Hedge Fund Collapse, as Does
Harvard Endowment
By Christopher Rowland
The Boston Globe
August 2, 2007
The Massachusetts
state pension system lost $30 million with
this week's collapse of Sowood Capital
Management LP, the first evidence that
public money also went down the drain when
the $3 billion Boston hedge fund lost more
than half of its value in July. It is the
second hedge fund closing to take a toll on
the state's $50 billion pension fund in less
than a year. In September, the state lost
more than $50 million when energy oriented
hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors LLC, shut its
doors. Sowood liquidated its fund and sold
its remaining assets to Citadel Investment
Group LLC on Monday.
The biggest loser so
far appears to be Harvard University, which
is maintaining an official silence on the
issue. Harvard's endowment lost at least
$250 million, which is half of the original
$500 million it invested at Sowood's
inception in 2004. [Read
More]
New Jersey
N.J. Towns Brace for
Huge Increase in Pension Obligations
By Thomas Dunford
The Press of Atlantic
City
August 26, 2007
New Jersey towns and counties face massive
increases in pension fund bills due in
April, according to the state Treasury
Department. In 2008, they will pay a
combined $1.06 billion into pension funds, a
dramatic increase over the 453 million they
paid just five years ago. [Read
More]
Crooked New Jersey
Officials Forfeit Pensions Under New Law
The Associated Press
Ashbury Park Press
August 13, 2007
The old adage that
crime doesn't pay is certainly true for any
politician attempting to collecting a full
pension after a public service career
tainted by corruption. The board that
oversees retirement benefits of public
employees has slashed the benefits of
several veteran public servants who tried to
collect their pensions after being convicted
of public corruption.
A law that went into
effect in April makes it impossible for a
government employee to collect any pension
benefits after a corruption conviction or
guilty plea. That law, signed by the
governor without fanfare this spring, makes
pension forfeitures automatic and prison
time mandatory for government employees-
including politicians- who accept bribes,
launder money or commit related felonies.
[Read More]
New Jersey Benefit Crisis Has No Easy
Answer
By Adrienne Lu
Trenton Bureau
Herald News
August 13, 2007
For the first time
ever, New Jersey's largest state workers
union ratified a contract this year that
requires employees and retirees to
contribute to their health insurance. The
Corzine administration, however, later
agreed to keep free health insurance for any
retirees who enroll in a 'wellness program'
that was supposed to save taxpayers money.
It turns out that 'wellness program' doesn't
even exist yet.
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